Background and measurement
Research continues to struggle with definitional and measurement questions that confound attempts to assess the dynamics of poverty and inequality. In the following section we discuss the drivers of poverty that have been identified in literature and that form the conceptual frame for this analysis.
Current levels of poverty in Africa
The world has achieved tremendous declines in poverty in recent decades.
This progress has occurred unevenly, Tables 2 and 3 for numbers).
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Our forecast suggests that as most countries make progress against severe and extreme poverty, these individuals will increasingly be concentrated in a handful of countries. By 2030, 70,7%
of the burden of extreme poverty on the continent is likely to be concentrated in just 10 countries (see Figure 3 ). By 2063 this will have increased to 75,7% (see Figure 5 ). We model this pillar using a combination of agricultural improvements developed for an earlier publication on a green revolution in Africa and designed to increase not only agricultural yields but also domestic demand for food through programmes such as cash transfers. 63 We also include improvements to infrastructure, especially rural roads, water and sanitation, information and communications technology, and electricity. We also include increases in government regulatory quality to address the inefficiencies that keep poor people from participating effectively in markets.
This set of interventions models increases in security through decreases in the risk of conflict. This could be generated by increasing the effectiveness and scope of domestic or AU peacekeeping forces and investments in conflict prevention. 
Impact of efforts to reduce poverty
Overall findings are summarised in Table 2 and include the base case forecast, the impact of each of the four intervention clusters, and the combined impact of all four on the percentage of the population living in poverty. Table 3 (Table 3) . However, despite the improvements in poverty levels, these figures still represent 7,2% and 18,4% of the total population (Table 2 ). This suggests that even with a concerted effort to reduce poverty, Africa is unlikely to achieve 2030 target to eliminate extreme poverty. In fact, only three additional countries make the goal. Progressive social change requires addressing the inequalities that keep people in poverty even when others are making progress Kenya makes the most significant gains in this group in our combined intervention scenario, but does not quite achieve a
We find that the impacts of our interventions line up relatively well with those of other researchers What drives these differences? and 7,3% respectively).
Considering the second group of countries, we find that they have Policies need to be tailored to the unique circumstances of each country 
Impact on initial poverty estimates
The Center for Global Development We first compare our results to those of Brookings at a regional level.
As shown in Table 6 , our estimates are higher than those of Brookings in three regions: Asia and Pacific, sub-Saharan Africa, and South and West Asia.
Of these, the discrepancies in South and West Asia are the most significant.
They are largely due to differences in the estimates of extreme poverty in India (where our estimate for millions in extreme poverty is approximately double that of Brookings; see Table 7 ). Even under our combined intervention a large number of African states are unlikely to make the 3% extreme poverty target by 2030 68 In order to apply the Burt, Hughes, Milante framework to our paper we applied their package of extended interventions to our country grouping and compared the impact of our interventions, which were applied to all countries in the continent, with the impact of their interventions on all of the African states defined as fragile by the World Bank. For our comparison with the CPRC, we tried to replicate its interventions (which reported the degree of change but not the time frame over which it was enacted) by using the same parameter changes it did, applied over a 10-year time frame for rollout starting in 2015.
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69 Initial estimates of poverty in all these scenarios differ slightly because some of the parameters can only be set as initial conditions.
70 We have used the ratio of GDP per capita at PPP values from 2011 and 2005 to shift our national account-based estimates of household consumption and to compute initial revised estimates of poverty at both US$0,70 and US$1,25 per day, while keeping our 2005-based values. In general these new estimates will be lower, in some cases substantially lower. We will not convert our poverty forecasts to the new ICP values until the larger community has converged in interpretation around the proper procedures and new poverty levels.
71 See Sarah Dykstra, Charles Kenny and Justin Sandefur, Global absolute poverty fell by almost half on Tuesday, Center for Global Development, 2 May, 2014, http://www. cgdev.org/blog/global-absolute-poverty-fellalmost-half-tuesday, accessed. Note that we use their corrected numbers.
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